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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES
AFFECTING PUBLIC UTILITIES
By
GILBERT NuRICK'

The subject under discussion at this time has so many broad ramifications
that unless we keep our eyes straight ahead, we shall find ourselves travelling on
some interesting but remote and relatively unimportant by-ways. We are concerned today with the technique of compulsory arbitration as applied to labor
disputes affecting public utilities. In order to come to grips with the main: problem, we shall eliminate from our consideration the subordinate issue of the use
of compulsory arbitration in the settlement of disputes which merely involve the
interpretation of an existing labor agreement.
Our real concern is the use of this compulsory process as a means of enforcing settlement of disputes arising out of the negotiation,rather than the interpretation, of labor contracts. The typical situation is the struggle between the company and the union when, following collective bargaining, they are unable to
achieve agreement on such important issues as wages or working conditions. Mediation and conciliation have failed to induce an agreement and a strike or lockout
appears imminent. When arbitration is required in such cases, the parties are
compelled to submit their differences to some agency established by the government. In effect, that agency determines the contractual terms which will be binding on the parties. This is a serious and disturbing mechanism and merits serious
attention. Consequently, when we speak of "compulsory arbitration," we shall
confine the scope of that term to the enforced settlement of disputes resulting in
what might be called "compulsory contracts." As thus limited, the subject is of
particular interest to this section since compulsory arbitration laws of this type in
the United States are confined almost entirely to the public utility field.
There is a popular song which proclaims that its author was "born in Kansas
and was bred in Kansas." This description might well be applied to compulsory
arbitration in the United States. If we may by-pass the Adamson Law of 1916,
which, by Congressional compulsion, settled a railroad dispute by establishing
the eight-hour day (39 Stat. 721; upheld in Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37
S. Ct. 298 (1916) ), we may acknowledge that so far as American experience
goes, compulsory arbitration was born and bred in Kansas. Like many other prominent births in recorded history, moreover, this blessed or cursed event-depending on your viewpoint-was preceded by severe labor pains.
*A.B., Pennsylvania State College, 1928; LL.B., Dickinson Law School, 1931; President of
Dauphin County Bar Association; Chairman of Statutory Law Committee of Pennsylvania Bar
Association; Formerly Chairman of Section on Administrative Law of the Pennsylvania Bar Asso.
ciation; Formerly member of Executive Committee of Pennsylvania Bar Association.
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It has been estimated that during the period 1915 through 1919, approximately 700 strikes afflicted the Kansas coal mines. A serious shortage of coal
resulted and the state, proceeding under its anti-trust laws, appointed a receiver
for the mines and proceeded to operate them under National Guard protection.
The U. S. Army also stationed troops in the area of disturbance. Against this
backdrop of crisis and public furore, the Kansas legislature, in special session in
1920, adopted its compulsory arbitration law (Kansas General Statutes Annotated
1935; 44-60 et seq.) over the vigorous opposition of organized labor. This statute
established the Court of Industrial Relations, composed of three, "judges" with
jurisdiction over certain industries deemed to affect the public interest. It expressly covered the manufacture and transportation of food and food products
and wearing apparel and the mining or production of fuel as well as the services
of public utilities and common carriers. The court, which was essentially an administrative agency rather than a judicial body, was empowered to settle all controversies involving such industries and to seize and operate them during emergencies. Strikes, boycotts, picketing and 'intimidation were made unlawful.
The court promptly proceeded to investigate the coal mining industry. Certain officials of the UMW were summoned as witnesses, ignored the summons,
were cited for contempt and were sentenced to jail. A strike was thereupon called
despite the anti-strike provisions of the law. An injunction was obtained, was
likewise disregarded and a jail sentence of one year imposed for the second contempt. Both contempt sentences were appealed and were sustained by the U. S.
Supreme Court in 1922 inHowat v. Kansas, 258 U. S. 181, 42 S. Ct. 277 (1922),
without passing upon the constitutionality of the legislation.
The following year, however, the question of constitutionality was presented
squarely and decided in Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations
of State of Kansas, 262 U. S. 522, 43 S. Ct. 630 (1923); (see also 267 U. S.
552, 45 S. Ct. 441 (1925) ), the Court holding that the food industry was not a
"business clothed with a public interest" so as to justify wage determinations as
a permissible restriction on freedom of contract under the due process clause. It
is of particular interest that the Court by way of dictum regarded public utilities
and common carriers as examples of businesses which are affected with a public
interest. In any event, it is confidently predicted that if the holding in the Wolff
Packing case should be urged as a preedent today to invalidate compulsory arbitration of disputes involving businesses other than utilities, it would be relegated
to that special chamber in the judicial morgue reserved for such illustrious corpses
as Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 277 (1908); Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U. S. 1, 35 S. Ct. 240 (1915); and Adkins v. Children'sHospital, 261 U. S. 525,
43 S. Ct. 394 (1923).
History records that the Court of Industrial Relations expired for all practical purposes even before the Volff Packing decision. It atrophied from general
indifference and mounting opposition. The court was abolished officially in 1925
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even though the statute still remains on the books, bloody and not unbowed. Thus,
at this point, the boisterous offspring from Kansas, after a painful birth and a
robust and vigorous infancy, became an unwanted and unclaimed waif.
Compulsory arbitration, born in the aftermath of World War I and buried
several years later, was resurrected with the advent of World War 1I when the
National War Labor Board operated in effect as a compulsory arbitration agency.
This experience must not be confused, however, with the type of compulsory arbitration legislation which we are discussing today. The board was founded originally by executive order of President Roosevelt grounded upon the "no strike-no
lockout" pledge takc- by labor and management in December, 1941. It included
representatives of labor, management and the public and was organized as a patriotic contribution to the v'ar effort. Having served the purposes of its creation,
it was dissolved by executive order of President Truman on January 3, 1946.
Shortly after the cessation of hostilities, labor unions aggressively asserted
the pent-up demands of their members for increased wages and improved working conditions. These demands led to a large number of strikes, some of which
involved public utilities. When a utility like an electric, gas, water or sewage
company stops operating, the public is hit hard and fast. Not only is there inconVenience to patrons, but such strikes constitute a definite and immediate hazard to
health and life. It is not difficult to perceive why a large body of the public firmly
believes that work stoppages in such basic utilities should not be tolerated.
In their distress and under the terrific pressure engendered by public indignation, many states in 1947 grasped at compulsory arbitration as a solution to
their problem. During that year, Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin enacted
legislation providing for compulsory arbitration, seizure, or both in public utility
labor disputes. These states, together with North Dakota (which had enacted a
law in 1941) and Kansas comprised a total of twelve states in which such laws
were in effect. The New Jersey Court of Appeals in State of New Jersey v. Traffic
Telephone Workers' Federation et al., decided May 26, 1949, 2 N. J. 335, 66 A.
2d 616 (1949), invalidated the law of that state on the ground that it did not
prescribe adequate standards to guide the arbitrators and consequently
unlawfully delegated legislative powers. This defect was later cured by amendment. The Michigan law was likewise invalidated by the Michigan Supreme
Court in Local 170 T. W. U., et al. v. Gadola, et al., 322 Mich. 332, on September
8, 1948, on the grounds that it required the appointment of a circuit judge as
chairman of a board of arbitration in contravention of the division-of-powers provisions of the state constitution and that it failed to prescribe adequate standards
for the exercise of the delegated powers. The Michigan legislature later eliminated compulsory arbitration and substituted fact finding in its stead.
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For your information and convenience, there is submitted as a supplement
to this article, a table summarizing the provisions of the various state statutes and
citing the decisions thereunder.* It will be noted that there is much diversity
in the provisions of the laws with respect to the types of businesses and services
covered, the method of administration, the standards prescribed, the provisions
for enforcement, the sanctions and penalties and judicial review.
There is a wealth of literature on the pros and cons of compulsory arbitration. A summary with appropriate topical divisions and bibliography of material
is presented as another supplement to this report.** While these are not submitted as a complete review of all the available literature, I believe that they comprise a generous helping of the digestible material on the subject.
It is highly desirable that we survey the beachhead established by the advocates of compulsory arbitration and determine whether, in the national interest,
we ought to liquidate it or contain it within its present boundaries, or seek to expand it. It is necessary, in this delicate assignment, to cut under the emotional
surface and view the problem objectively.
First, let us inquire: "Who wants this thing called compulsory arbitration
and why?" Organized labor definitely does not want it. I belie,,e it is also a
fair statement that the overwhelming sentiment of management is opposed to it.
The real zeal for such legislation comes from a large and influential segment of
the public which contends that the community is so dependent upon essential utility services for its very existence that work stoppages affecting such services simply
cannot be tolerated. They assert that where the health and safety of the public
are so directly affected, the well-being of the public must be paramount and the
economic interests of the warring parties must be subordinated.
They argue that compulsory arbitration is entirely consistent with democratic
principles, since the people in the exercise of their rights as citizens voluntarily
establish this process through their elected representatives. They answer the averment of the Kansas failure with the counter claim that the Court of Industrial Relations was riddled with politics-as if this condition is the exclusive plague of
the Sunflower State!
As lawyers, we must acknowledge that the proponents of compulsory arbitration make out a prima facie case. When we dissect the arguments of the opponents, however, and cut through the tissues of emotionalism, we find a hard
core of real sensv which calls for pause and serious reflection. The national policy
in labor relations has been to encourage collective bargaining. My own experi*A copy of this table which is entitled "Summary of the State Laws Providing for Compulsory
Arbitration (with or without seizure) of Labor Disputes Affecting Public Utilities," may be had
without charge upon written request to the DICKINSON LAW REVIEW. Ed.
* *This summary is to be found at the conclusion of the artide. Ed.
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ence in an office handling a fair number of such cases indicates that when th
disputants know in advance that there will be an arbitration, this knowledge in
and of itself usually retards genuine bargaining. Both sides lose the will and
incentive to make those final concessions which are so important in achieving
agreement. Even where a statute prescribes adequate standards, they generally
are not mutually acceptable and the ultimate adjudication appears unreasonable
in the eyes of the disappointed party. There is less enthusiasm to abide by an
agreement foisted on the parties than by the terms of a contract voluntarily executed after collective bargaining. This reluctance is aggravated by the strong
conviction of the parties that their freedom of contract has been impaired. The
union sulks at the deprivation of its most effective weapon-th'e right to strike.
Lowell once wrote that "One thorn of experience is worth a whole wilderness of learning." We have already noted from the thorny Kansas experience
that one does not stop strikes by merely enacting a law prohibiting them. History
tecords other thorns of experience which dampen one's ardor for compulsory arbitration. The modern renaissance of this process was in New Zealand in 1894.
It was applied there with notable irregularity and was abandoned on occasion.
In 1904, Australia enacted the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act,
which has experienced a checkered career. Australia has an area almost as large
as that of the United States, but its total population is somewhat less than that of
New York City. Obviously, its economy is much less complex than that of this
country, and the problems of administering and enforcing compulsory arbitration
there should be much less formidable than the difficulties encountered here. Yet
statistics indicate that its strike rate exceeds that of the United States! Denmark,
too, established an extensive system of compulsory arbitration in its tiny domain
in 1936, but repealed it the following year. Norway and Sweden have employed
compulsory arbitration to meet specific situations but have shied away from a
general law adopting this principle.
Thus, we must conclude that actual experience with compulsory arbitration
has not fulfilled the glowing predictions of its most insistent advocates. We have
observed, too, that the compulsory technique is fraught with danger and that the
public could be the unwitting victim of a process specially designed for its protection but failing in its purpose.
What should we, as lawyers, recommend as a course of action? It is not
simple to venture a solution to this delicate and difficult problem without arousing the ire of labor or management or a vocal part of the public or a combination
of these elements. Yet, in the best tradition of our profession, we should have
the courage to utter our sincere views on this controversial issue.
I believe that compulsory arbitration has gone far enough for the time being.
We should observe its operations carefully in those states which have adopted it
and compare the results with conditions in those jurisdictions which have not yet
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entered the dubious fold. We should resist any effort to expand the coverage of
such legislation to industries where a work stoppage would not directly and
promptly affect public health and safety even though such industries may also be
clssified technically as "public utilities." It will be noted from the table submitted with this article that several of the state statutes include transportation within
their orbit. There is a vast difference between a water company, for example, and
a bus operator. In the one, a work stoppage would cause an immediate and direct
threat to health and safety. The water company invariably enjoys a monopoly
and the community has no substitute available. On the other hand, a suspension
of bus service does not directly imperil public health and safety, and there are
several alternatives available to the patrons of the "struck" company. After all,
the chief competitor of the bus company is the private car, and if necessary, one
can even walk.
A strike of an electric, sewage or gas company has a direct effect on the health
of the people affected. On the other hand, a strike of a trucking company would
hardly cause a serious impairment to the health of the community., although it
could cause much inconvenience. There are several other media of transportation
available to the public.
We must realize, moreover, that compulsory arbitration of rates of pay and
those expensive "fringes on top" inevitably affect the price of the commodity or
service sold by the company. Where a utility enjoys a monopoly, there is less likelihood of serious prejudice than in the case of a motor carrier which competes
not only with other carriers performing the same type of service but also with
other modes of transportation, including the privately-owned vehicle. These are
service industries, and wages and salaries comprise approximately half of their
operating expenses. One unrealistic award could eliminate the company from
the field of its enterprise to the detriment of the company, its employees, and the
public. It would seem much better from the standpoint of all concerned to endure a strike of average duration rather than force a settlement which would result in abandonment of service.
These considerations, I submit, make it advisable to observe and appraise
the effects of existing laws before we expand their coverage. While we are testing compulsory arbitration in the crucible of experience within its present limits,
we should try to perfect better techniques consistent with the policy of free collective bargaining. The method of fact finding has, by no means, been given a
fair and adequate trial. When properly and fairly applied, it can bring to bear
the very strong pressure of public opinion for a voluntary settlement. We should
intensify our efforts to halt work stoppages through the media of better understanding between employer and employee, more scientific and effective conciliation, mediation and fact finding before we gamble too heavily on compulsory
arbitration.
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If these voluntary methods work, we shall not need the dangerous weapon
of compulsory arbitration. There will then be no necessity to enforce by legislative shotgun a wedding which is distasteful to both the bride and groom. If
the voluntary techniques do not work after a thorough and fair trial, we shall then
face the dilemma of the marriage or the gun. My point simply is that we ought
to give the suitors who are sold on the efficacy of free collective bargaining more
time and opportunity before we pull the trigger.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY*
(In this summary, the arguments pro indicate those supporting compulsory
arbitration; those contra signify arguments opposing compulsory arbitration.)
I
PUBLIC INTEREST
Pro

1. The welfare of the country must come first, in a conflict between any
group and the nation.
President Truman, "The Strike Crisis," a radio address to the nation on the eve of the railroad strike, reprinted in 92 Cong. Rec. May
25, 1946 at 5793. Accord: President Wilson, address before the AFL,
Buffalo, N. Y., on Nov. 12, 1917 (quoted in 30 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc.
123 (1946).
Above all rights is duty to the community. Some industrial disputes cannot
continue without danger to the community.
Justice Brandeis, joined by Justices Holmes and Clarke, Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 488 (1921).

Unions cannot axtopt a process which would disintegrate society, no matter
how right they are.
Judge T. Allen Goldsborough, United States v. Brotherhood of

Locomotive Engineers, 79 F. Supp. 485, 487 (D.D.C. '1948), cert. den.
69 S.Ct. 137 (1948).
Every citizen owes primary allegiance to the welfare of the public; and secondary loyalty to his labor organization.
Huggins, William L., Labor and Democracy (New York: MacMillan 1922)

passim.

Freedom and Constitutional rights of the individual must yield to those of
society in labor relations as they have in other fields.
!*The author gratefuly acknowledges the valuable assistance of his ofice associates and par.
ticularly James H. Booser, Esq., and Jefferson C. Barnhart, Esq., in conducting the research and
assembling the material for the supplements submitted with this article.
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HuebnLr, Carl A., "Compulsory Arbitration of Labor Disputes,"
30 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc., 123, 128 (1946).
2. The soft coal and railroad strikes of 1946 demonstrated that the public
will not permit work stoppages in vital industries.
Gerhart, Eugene C., "Strikes and Eminent Domain," 30 Jour. Am.
Jud. Soc. 116 (citing: Editorial, "A Threat to Liberty," N. Y. Times,
Sept. 8, 1946); President Truman, loc. cit. supra,Argument 1; Slichter,
'What Do the Strikes Teach Us?", 177 Atlantic Monthly 35 (1946);
Jaffe, "The Public Right Dogma in Labor Board Cases," 59 Harv. L.
Rev. 720 (1946).
The post-war state statutes arise from a public decision that public welfare
demands no work stoppages in public utilities, and that they simply cannot be
tolerated.
Williams, Jerre S., "Compulsory Settlement of Labor Disputes,"
27 Texas L. Rev. 587, 614, 657 (1949).
3. The public has an interest in labor disputes different from that of the
adversaries, due to the interdependence of our industrial society. We cannot
endure long on a large scale paralysis of public services or of the necessities of
life.
Emery, James A., Address before National Founders Assn. of New
York, on Nov. 17, 1943, quoted in 30 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc. 124 (1946).
The public has learned that unions are able and willing to paralyze public
utility services in flagrant disregard of civil liberties, rights and general welfare
of the people.
Richberg, Donald R., "Labor Disputes and Public Utilities," an
address before the American Bar Association at Atlantic City, N. J., on
October 29, 1946 (reported in 19 LRRM 143 (1947)).
4. A strike against an agent of thL public rendering a public service is on
a par with a strike by government employees.
Ibid., 144.
5. Since every statute infringes upon liberty, the real question is whether
the infringement is justifiable. Strikes interfere more and more unjustly with
the liberties of employers, employees, and the public than the proposed substitute.
Parsons, Frank, "Compulsory Arbitration," 17 Arena 663 (1897).
Accord: Richberg, Donald, Address before Harvard Law School
Forum, March 14, 1947, in Commercial and Financial Chronicle, March
20, 1947.
6. In compensation for the growth of power of unions and management,
the state must assume greater power than either can wield.
Editorial, Buffalo Commercial, April 20, 1920.
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7. The state has the same right to prevent violence and hardship that it has
to forfeit the freedom of families infected with smallpox, namely the police
power.
Gov. Allen of Kansas, Debate with Samuel Gompers, in Carnegie
Hall, N. Y., on May 28, 1920 (reported in 123 Columbia University
Studies in Pol. Sci., No. 2, 41 (1926)).
Contra
1. The public interest cannot be distinguished from the common interests
of labor and management. No policy can succeed that does not serve the interests
of democratic trade unionism and private enterprise, and does not respect economic
and personal liberties, because most citizens belong to one or the other group.
Freidin, Jesse, "The Public Interest in Labor Dispute Settlement,"
12 Law and Contemp. Prob. 367 (1947).

The public is composed of different groups, some of whose interests are
similar to those of the parties. Many are indifferent to the ethical values of any
issue that conflicts with their comfort.
Gompers, Samuel, 20 American Federationist, 17, 26 (1913).
2. Balancing the elements of the public interest-self-organization, collective
bargaining, right to strike, and to lockout, equality at the bargaining table, free
enterprise system, economic stability and maximum production against continued
production of essential goods and services,-public interest is opposed to legislation controlling emergency work stoppages.
Sigal, Benjamin C., "National Emergency Strikes and Public Interest," 27 North Carolina L. Rev. 213, 218 (Feb. 1949).
3. It is impossible to determine in our complicated economy where or when
the public interest starts and ends.
Houston, John M., "Case Against 'Undermining' Wagner Act,"
address to a joint meeting of AFL, CIO, Int'l. Assoc. of Machinists, and
Railroad Brotherhoods at Wichita, Kansas (reported in 19 LRRM 136,
141 (1947)).
Accord: Statement of Policy by the Research and Policy Committee
of the Committee for Economic Development. Collective Bargaining,
How to Make It More Effective, February, 1947.
4. We do not hear enough about the public's obligations in a labor dispute.
Various public groups judge all disputes on a preconceived prejudice and not
after informing themselves on the merits.
Morse, Wayne L., "Arbitration of Labor Disputes," Commonwealth
Rev., University of Oregon (March 1941).
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5. The Arbitration Acts in Australia and New Zealand result in the public's
paying more for products of industries regulated by a board or court where there
is no foreign competition.
Report of a Royal Commission cited in speech of Hon. A. 0.
Stanley of Kentucky in U. S. Senate, Dec. 15, 1919, quoted in Beman,
Compulsory Arbitration of Industrial Disputes (New York: Wilson
1920) 166.
6. The public cannot afford work stoppage; but neither can it afford degraded manhood.
Gompers, Samuel, loc. cit. supra, Argument 1 Contra.
7. In the light and power industries, almost all contracts of the IBEW include provisions for voluntary arbitration as the final step in dispute settlements.
They also contain no-strike clauses, guaranteeing continuity of operation. There
have been no interruptions in these plants in 28 years. In the field of local streetcars and buses, the AFL has a requirement of voluntary arbitration in its national
constitution.
Shiskin, Boris, "The Settlement of Contract Negotiation Disputes:
A Labor Viewpoint," 12 Law and Contemp. Prob. 357, 361 (1947).
8. The cause of the wave of strikes immediately following V-J Day was
inflation and the sharp rise in the cost of living. Further sharp increases in prices
and cost of living are unlikely. The important question now is not to prevent
work stoppages, but to avert widespread unemployment and breakdown in wage
standards.
Ibid., 359.
II
PRACTICABILITY
AND LABOR
OF
MANAGEMENT
A. ATTITUDES
Pro

1. Owners of utilities have no objection since their rates, services and accounting, and abandonment of their public services are already regulated.
Richberg, Donald R., loc. cit. supra, Argument I (3) Pro, 144.
2. Employees who rely on a utility for a living should understand that the
public relies on them for continuous service.
Id.
3. Despite the numbLr of strikes and administrative difficulties in Australia,
few groups suggest abandonment.
Williams, Jerre S., loc. cit. supra, Argument I (2) Pro, 597 (citing:
Foenander, Wartime Labour Developments in Australia, note 47, at
XVI, C.V.; Evatt, "Control of Labor Relations in the Commonwealth'of
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Australia," 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 529, 549 (1939); Ross, "Conciliation
and Arbitration in Australia and New Zealand: Recent Developments
in Australian Industrial Relations," 2 Ind. and Lab. Rels. Rev. 98, 105
(1948).
4. One of the outstanding contributions of the 1946 Victoria Convention of
Kiwanis International was a resolution calling on the national legislature to "provide for compulsory arbitration of all disputes prior to the calling of a strike
which might endanger the national welfare or impinge upon the Constitutional
rights of the citizen."
Senator Wiley from Wisconsin, Kiwanis Magazine, Oct., 1946.
5. Employees and unions should stop merely telling the public what they are
against and join in constructive proposals which will insure continuous production
in essential industries.
Slichter, Sumner H., New York Times Magazine, April 27, 1947.
Contra
1. Neither management nor organized labor wants compulsory arbitration.
Belloc, The Servile State (London: Constable & Co. 1913, 1927)
172, 176; Huebner, Carl A., loc. cit. supra, Argument 1 (1) Pro, 126;
Morse, Wayne L., loc. cit. supra, Argument I(3) Contra; 113 New Republic 3 (July 2, 1945); Ross, G. W. C., "The Constitutional History
of Industrial Arbitration in Australia," 30 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1945)
Labor Opposes); Witte, Edwin E., The Government in Labor Disputes
New York: McGraw Hill 1932) 307; Green, William, House Hearings, 80th Congress, Volume 3, 1648-1660; Whitney, A. F., Hearings
before House Committee, 80th Congress, on Amendments to the NLRA,
Vol. 3, p. 1547.
Representatives of the National Association of Manufacturers, the United
States Chamber of Commerce, and the Committee on Economic Development
were all opposed to compulsory arbitration.
Schwellenbach, Lewis B., Secretary of Labor. House Labor Committee, 80th Congress, Volume 5, 3027-3028.
Enforced settlement of contract negotiation disputes is opposed by both
management and labor.
Williams, Jerre S., loc. cit. supra, Argment I (2) Pro, (citing:
Fitzpatrick, "The Settlement of Contract Negotiation Disputes, a Business Viewpoint," 12 Law and Contemp. Probs. 346, 353 (1947); hearings before Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 55 and
S.}. Res. 22, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-4 (1947).
Management, in the transportation field is currently resisting arbitration except on the basis of standards it has at least assisted in formulating.
Hawat, Bruce B., "Will We Toss 'Blank Check' Arbitration Out?",
Mass Transportation, June 1949, p. 35 et seq.
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B. ENFORCEABILITY
Pro

1. Laws prohibiting strikes will not eliminate strikes;' but neither do laws
against speeding eliminate speeding.
Williams, JLrre S., loc. cit. supra, Argument I (2) Pro, 652.

2. Compulsory arbitration is not fully satisfactory, but is the best available
until co-operation arrives.
Parsons, Frank, "Compulsory Arbitration," loc. cit. supra, Argument I (5) Pro.
3. Compulsory arbitration, outside of the imperfections of any plan, has
through many years, worked well in Denmark, Sweden, Australia, New Zealand
and Great Britain.
Hutbner, Carl A., loc. cit. supra, Argument I (1) Pro, 129 (citing
many general references to treatises and articles on the systems in these
countries).
Contra
1. The strike records of countries having compulsory arbitration, with the
exception of New Zealand, have been worse than ours.
Houston, John M., loc. cit. supra, Argument I (3) Contra, 141.
Accord as to Australia: Williams, Jerre S., loc. cit. rupra, Argument I (2) Pro, 596.
Accord as to Australia and New Zealand: Shishkin, Boris, loc. cit.
supra, Argument I (7) Contra, 362.
Despite increasing "teeth" in the Australian law, and the outlawing of strikes
and lockouts, the latter have not been successfully eliminated.
Ross, G. W. C., loc. cit. supra, Argument II (A) (1) Contra, 22.
2. You cannot stop strikes by law. They are negative acts of nonresistance.
Gompers, Samuel, loc. cit. supra, Argument I (1) Contra.
3. In the larger strikes, the number of people involved makes it impossible
for the court to collect fines or order imprisonment.
123 Columbia University Studies in Pot. Sci. (1926), No. 2, 214.
Would be unenforceable because opposed by large minorities.
Morse, Wayne L., loc. cit. supra, Argument I (4) Contra.
4. Possibly workers could be induced by threats of penalties to work, but not

to work effectively.
Frey, Alexander Hamilton, "The Logic of Collective Bargaining
and Arbitration," 12 Law and Contemp. Prob. 264, 274 (1947).
Accord: Fitzpatrick, Bernard H., "The Settlement of Contract Ne-

gotiation Disputes: A Business Viewpoint," 12 Law and Contemp. Probems 346, 353 (1947).
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5. An employer and his employees must live together, as must a married
couple, even after a shot-gun wedding. When the terms of the relationship are
imposed without the willing submission of the parties, and with opposition by
one or both, there will not be a mutual feeling of fair treatment, without which
lqw morale, petty bickering, suspicion, a highly technical interpretation of the
order, creation of border-line conditions looking to a challenge of the continuation
of the order, multiplied litigation and board proceedings will result, interfering
with the joint task of production.
Id. (Frey).
Accord that it will be the source of further conflict: Green, William, House Hearings, Vol. 3, p. 1642.
6. During its short existence the Kansas Act was flouted by many rebellious
unions.
Smith, Russell A. and Delancey, William, "The State Legislature
and Unionism," 38 Mich. L. Rev. 987, 1030 (1940).
Accord: Witte, loc. cit. supra, Argument II (A) (1) Contra, 257.
7. Writers on labor problems have concurred that compulsory arbitration is
a failure in democratic foreign countries.
Teller, Ludwig, A Labor Policy for America (New York: Baker
Voorhis 1945) 259.
8. Experience from War Labor Board days shows that the fiats of the board,
even though backed by moral suasion of the War, did not stop strikes, and produced many strikes.
Fitzpatrick, Bernard H., loc. cit. supra, Argument 11 (B) (4)
Contra.
9. Where it has been tried it has not prevented strikes.
Mosher, Ira, before Senate Labor Committee, 80th Congress, Part
2, p. 953; Stassen, Harold L., Senate Hearings, 80th Congress, Part 1,
569.
10. It is clear that compulsory arbitration has not eliminated labor disputes
in those countries where it has been used.
Roberts, Harold S., Compulsory Arbitration of Labor Disputes
(University of Hawaii: Legislative Reference Bureau 1949) 27.
III
ARBITRATION PERSONNEL
Pro
1. Partisan representation does not result in conspiracy detrimental to the
public.
Col. Univ. Studies, etc., cit. supra, Argument II (B) (3) Contra,
213.
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2. Public representatives will not oppose wage increases in utilities.
President Wilson, Letter to Railroad Brotherhoods, in reply to their
request that he veto the Esch-Cummings Act of 1920.
Contra
1. Arbitrators are often poorly informed respecting practices and technical
aspects of the industry involved.
Witte, Edwin L., op. cit. supra, Argument II (A) (1) Contra,
307; Col. Univ. Studies, etc., cit. supra, Argument 11 (13) (3) Contra,
204.
2. In wage disputes, arbitrators have almost never awarded the offer of demand of either side. This means that arbitrators either "split the difference" or
the parties do not bargain for agreement.
Smith, Janes Morgan, "Bonine-Tripp v. Taft-Hartley: Compulsory
Arbitration of Disputes in Public Utilities," 9 Detroit L. Rev. 58, 61
(1948) ; Indicating that splitting of differences would be more generally
employed by arbitrators: Arbitration between the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen and the Eastern Railroads (1913), p. 6.
In the absence of standards, the tendency to compromise and be guided by
expediency is inevitable.
Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt in State of New Jersey v. Traffic
Telephone Workers, etc., N. J. Supreme Court, May 26, 1949, reported
in 24 LRRM 2071, 2079 (1949) (declaring the N. J. Utility AntiStrike Law unconstitutional); "Split the difference" is too often prevalent in arbitration, Huebner, Carl A. loc. cit. supra, Argument I (1)
Pro, 126.
3. Arbitrators appointed by the powers that be from the dominant social
group, will maintain conditions and ethical standards as they are and therefore
will rule against labor which has always been challenging current ethical standards.
Fitch, John A., "Industrial Peace by Law-The Kansas Way," 44
Survey 7-8, Apr. 3, 1920.
Arbitrators are biased because belonging to the professional classes, and
therefore having a class consciousness or dependence on management.
Manly, Basil M., "Arbitration and Industrial Justice," 46 Survey
44 (Apr. 8, 1922).
Accord: Gompers, Samuel, 20 American Federationist 17, 25
(1913).
4. The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations became enmeshed in politics.
Columbia Univ. Studies, etc., loc. cit. supra, Argument 11 (B) (3)
Contra, 51.
Accord: Gagliardo, Domenico, The Kansas Industrial Court, (University of Kansas Social Science Studies 1941) 227-228; Millis and
Montgomery, Organized Labor, 824-826.
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IV
STANDARDS
Pro
1. Equalization of wage rates with those in comparable situations has the
appeal of precedent and satisfies the normal expectations of the parties and the
public, stabilizes wages, sets a standard wage for a given skill, and prevents competitive advantage by paying low wages.
"Factors Relied on by Arbitrators in Determining Wage Rates," 47
Columbia L. Rev. 1026, 1028 (1947).
2. Setting wages and conditions by compulsory settlement is not difficult
in utilities. Prices and profits are already controlled, and the prevailing wage
technique is well developed and easy to apply.
Williams, Jerre S., loc. cit. supra, Argument I (2) Pro, 653.
Contra
1. Arbitration results in levelling-down. Skilled workers cannot get above
the minimum, which become the maximum, when fixed by the court.
Ahearn, W. F., 2 Reconstruction 24 (1920).
2. The prevailing wage as a criterion is static, only transmits wage increases
achieved by dynamic methods, and will not impose leadership in wages on an
employer. A labor group should receive its demands, if otherwise justified, regardless of other groups, since its leadership will rudound to the advantage of the
others.
"Factors Relied on by Arbitrators," etc., cit. supra, Argument IV,
(1) Pro, 1031.
3. The comparative wage system perpetuates differentials between jobs and
between industries where in some cases re-evaluation would be in order.
Id.
4. American experience shows that best results follow when the partius make
their own rules and arbitrators merely apply them.
Witte, Edwin E., op. cit. supra, Argument II (A) (1) Contra.
In contract negotiation disputes, the arbitrator is faced with an apparently
insurmountable obstacle, that is, to say what the agreement of the parties is when
they cannot reach an agreement.
Sanders, Paul H., "Types of Labor Disputes and Approaches to
Their Settlement," 12 Law and Contemp. Prob. 211, 217 (1947).
5. By what principles other than political expediency will the legislature
establish standards?
The result will be govurnment by men and not by law.
Frey, Alexander Hamilton, loc. cit. supra, Argument II (B) (4)
Contra, 273.
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6. "But the Board of Arbitration is nowhere directed to consider the rights
of the public, which will ultimately be called upon to foot the bill."
Chief Justice Vanderbilt, loc. cit. supra, Argument III (2) Contra.
7. Standards are undesirable because they tend to create strife by making
inflexible what should remain flexible-the ability of management and labor to
adjust to changing conditions.
Fitzpatrick, Bernard H., loc. cit. supra, Argument II (B) (4)
Contra.
V
RIGHT TO STRIKE
Pro
1. John L. Lewis has said that compulsory arbitration would enslave labor.
But if a miner must belong to the UMW to work and he must work under a contract negotiated by Lewis, is that less involuntary servitude than working under
one fixed by a government tribunal after full hearing?
Huebner, Carl A., lo. cit. supra, Argument I (1) Pro, 127.
2. When you give labor the better weapon and the protection of law, you
can take away the old weapon of the strike.
Huggins, William L., op. cit. supra, Argument 1 (1) Pro.
3. The Kansas Act curbed capital just as much as it curbed radical labor.
Id.
4. "To insure domestic tranquillity" law must be substituted for force in
labor disputes.
Parsons, Frank, loc. cit. supra, Argument I (5) Pro, 664.
5. For the sake of fairer and more reasonable settlements and the infusion
of equity into all relations between capital and labor, compulsory arbitration is
called for "to establish justice."
Id.
6. Every time reason is substituted for passion and force, a gain for character
development is scored.
Id.
7. Advancing civilization and government requires the substitution of court
compulsion for private compulsion.
Ibid., 668.
Accord: Senator Ferguson of Michigan, The Congressional Digest,
March 1947, p. 92.
See also to same effect: Huebner, Carl A., loc. cit. supra, Argument
1 (1) Pro, 129; Richberg, Donald K., loc. cit. supra, Argument I (3)
Pro, 143.
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8. In a modern prolonged work stoppage, the employer with huge financial
reserves, can compel servitude under his terms by starving employees and their
families.
Huebner, Carl A., loc. cit. supra, Argument I (1) Pro, 125.
9. Industrial plants are communities; arbitration is simply bringing in the
judge, without whom a community cannot get along.
Garrison, Lloyd K., Address to the American Management Assoc.,
1943, quoted in 30 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc. 125 (1946).
10. The individual results of arbitration are unpredictable; but so are the
results of unfettered trial by battle.
Allen-Gompers Debate, cit. rupra, Argument 1 (7) Pro, 41.
11. Compulsory arbitration puts the parties on an equal footing, regardless
of the disparity of their economic strength.
Columbia Univ. Studies, etc., cit. supra, Argument II (B) (3) 203.
12. It is useless to speculate whether the disappearance of the right to strike
from some areas is good or bad. It is the inevitableness of its disappearance, as
the price of a complex industrialized society, which is significant.
Williams, Jerre S., loc. cit. supra, Argument I (2) Pro, 651.
13. It substitutes reason and logic for a trial of strength by strike.
Bogen, Jules, Modern Industry, Aug. 15, 1946.

Contra
1. Taking away their one potent weapon will destroy labor unions.
Columbia Univ. Studies, etc., cit. supra, Argument II (B) (3)

38.

2. The strike is justifiable as a natural expression of unrest.
Gompers-Allen Debate, cit. supra, Argument I (7)

Pro.

3. If free men have the right to withhold their labor, they have the right to
do all lawful things in pursuit of that purpose. No court may deny free men these
natural rights.

Id.
4. The right to quit individually is of little avail if the quitting cannot be
done in such a way as to make it a matter of concern in det'ermining conditions
for himself and his fellows.
Fitch, John A., loc. cit. supra, Argument III (3) Contra.
5. A sounder social structure will eventuate if we do not arbitrarily check
social trends. The labor-management struggle has gone on since Colonial days,
and the social assets equal the liabilities.
Morse, Wayne L., loc. cit. supra, Argument I (4) Contra.
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VI
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
Pro
1. Employers would suffer no actual loss of freedom of contract, since today
his employees are likely to be so many that no labor pool can replace them, and
his only alternative is to risk government seizure or give in to demands, however
unreasonable.
Huebner, Carl A., loc. cit. supra, Argument I (1) Pro, 124.
2. How much actual freedom of contract is left today to the single employer
of the single employee when contracts are made by a few representatives of each
side in a distant metropolitan hotel or office?
Ibid., 126.
3. Absolute freedom of contract would mean that railroads could refuse to
contract with their employees, and could cease operating, except on their own
terms, however oppressive.
Ibid., 128.
4. It would only affect the labor cost side of the business which is already
largely controlled through control of other factors.
Ibid., 129.
Contra
1. While the utility remains responsible to the public and stockholders, it
is called on to cede its vital prerogative, of deciding what it can afford to pay employees, to a transient committee of three arbitrators.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 98, p. 36.
2. Those who urge compulsion overlook the fact that a labor dispute is not
over the meaning of a contract or law, but is over what the law (wages, hours
and conditions) shall be.
Houston, John M., loc. cig. supra, Argument I (3) Contra 140.
VII
EFFECT ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Pro
1. Cases settled by arbitration serve as a foundation and as precedents for
future settlements.
Columbia Univ. Studies, etc., op. cit. supra, Argument II (B) (3)
Contra, 203.
2. Bringing the parties together will give them a better understanding of
each other's position.
Ibid., 214.
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3. Compulsory arbitration will not destroy the effectiveness of the unions,
and therefore the unions themselves, since the workers would have greater need
to act collectively in presenting their cases and to have union leadership trained
to do so.
Huebner, Carl A., loc. cit. supra, Argument 1 (1) Pro, 129.
4. If compulsory arbitration followed the breakdown of collective bargaining, the bargaining would be based on a prediction as to what the public agency
might decide, and therefore would take the public interest into account, as it does
not at present.
Williams, Jerre S., loc. cit. supra, Argument I (2) Pro, 651.
Contra
1. When parties are hostile, belligerency may be increased by having them
confront each other with opposing arguments.
Columbia Univ. Studies, etc., cit. supra, Argument II (b)
Contra, 214.

(3)

2. The party who is in a weaker position makes the collective bargaining a
pro forma process, doing just enough to get before the compulsory arbitration
agency. Experience in Australia and here during war time bears this out.
Williams, Jerre S., loc. cit. supra, Argument I (2) Pro, 651.
Accord: Phillips, Philip G., "The Function of Arbitration in the
Settlement of Industrial Disputes," 33 Columbia L. Rev. 1366, 1390
(1933); Stassen, Harold E., Senate Hearings, 80th Congress, Part 1,
569.
3. So long as either party can expect governmental intervention, it will hope
that more can be gained by such intervention than by voluntary agreement, and
collective bargaining will be destroyed.
Houston, John M., loc. cit. supra, Argument 1 (3) Contra, 141;
See also: Frey, Alexander Hamilton, loc. cit. supra, Argument II (B)
(4) Contra, 269, 271; Freidin, Jesse, loc. cit. supra, Argument I (1)
Contra, 372; Smith, James Morgan, loc. cit. supra, Argument III (2)
Contra, 61. Accord that collective bargaining will be destroyed: Fitzpatrick, Bernard H., loc. cit. supra, Argument Il(B) (4) Contra; Roth,
Almon E., Senate Labor Committee, 80th Congress, Part 2, 607-610;
National Association of Manufacturers, Industrial Relations Department,
Jan. 13, 1947; Warren, Ed. L., cited in N. A. M. Ind. Rel. Memo. Jan.
13, 1947, 7.
4. So long as the government is in "the decision-making business," one of
the causes of strikes will be the desire to compel government intervention.
Freiden, Jesse, loc. cit. supra, Argument I (1) Contra, 372.
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VIII
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION
Pro
1. Managers and owners of utilities should not object since their rates, services and accounting are already regulated and they do not have the freedom to
abandon public service.
Richberg, Donald R., loc. cit. supra, Argument I (3) Pro, 144.
Contra
1. It opens the way for further intervention by government into prerogatives
of management.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 98, 34 et seq.; Stass'en,
Harold E., loc. cit. supra, Argument VII (2) Contra.
2. As we learned during the war, we cannot fix some terms of economic life
and leave hands off others. Australia and New Zealand started 40 years ago with
compulsory arbitration alone. Features had to be added such as compulsory unionism, control of unions and employers' organizations and governmental determination of wage movements.
Houston, John M., loc. cit. supra, Argument I (3) Contra, 140.
IX
RELATIVE FAIRNESS
Pro
1. It (the Kansas Act) curbs the tyranny of capital just as stringently as it
curbs that of radical labor.
. Allen-Gompers Debate, loc. cit. supra, Argument I (7)

Pro.

2. It involves investigation into the cost of living, wage rates and conditions
of employment, which benefit labor.
Id.
3. It puts the parties on an equal footing regardless of the disparity of their
economic strength.
Columbia Univ. Studies, etc., cit. supra, Argument I (B) (3)
Contra, 36, 203.
Contra
1. Delay in proceedings is unfair to labor. The worker is hurt immediately
and irretrievably by substandard wages and conditions; whereas, the business can
recoup a temporary loss in the long run. It is therefore unfair to take away the
right to strike, and impose on labor equal responsibilities.
Ibid., 43.
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2. Employers have an advantage over employees because they have available
all the documents, books and records from which to draw arguments.
Ibid., 206.
3. Control of all the great means of communications by employing interests
will increase the disparity of influence between the parties.
Gompers, Samuel, loc. cit. supra, Argument I (7) Pro.
4. In those areas where the strike is inappropriate, an alternative should be
provided to redress the inequality in bargaining power resulting from elimination
of the right to strike.
Smith, Oscar S., "The Effect of the Public Interest on the Right to
Strike and to Bargain Collectively," 27 North Carolina L. Rev. 210
(1949).

X
TENDENCY TOWARD STATE SOCIALISM
Pro
1. Rates, services, accounting and cessation of operation of utilities are already regulated by law.
Richberg, Donald R., loc. cit. supra, Argument I (3), Pro 144;
Williams, Jerre S., loc. cit. supra, Argument 1 (2) Pro, 653.
2. Utilities are agents of the public, authorized to render public services, and
strikes against them are on a par with strikes against the government.
Richberg, Donald R., Id.
3. The post-war state statutes arise from neither side, but from a general
public decision; therefore, for the first time, development of, and limitations upon
compulsory settlement are conditioned upon "the optimum manifestations of
democracy."
Williams, Jerre S., Ibid., 657.
4. The objective evidence does not show that it will inevitably lead to undesirable alterations of our political and economic system.
Id.
5. The Commonwealth Court has sprung from the people, and, as administered by it, compulsory arbitration is as consistent with democratic ideals as any
other reasonable and necessary limitation of freedom bas'ed upon social consent.
Foenander, Orwell de R., Solving Labor Problems in Australia,
(Melbourne Press 1941) 5-6.
6. It is neither impossible in a democratic soci-ety nor does it violate fundamental rights as the New Zealand and Australian experiences show.
Taft, Philip, Economics and Problems of Labor, 830-831.
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Contra
1. It will introduce state socialism by allowing the state to fix wages and
conditions and regulate operation.
Columbia Univ. Studies, etc., cit. supra, Argument II (B) (3)
Contra, 38; Stassen, Harold E., /oc. cit. supra,Argument VII (2) Contra.
2. It opens the door to further government intervention into management
prerogatives.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, loc. cit. supra, Argument VIII (1)
Contra.
3. Our American system is based on freedom of enterprise, freedom of contract, and freedom to withhold one's labor. Those who urge compulsion slight
these freedoms.
Houston, John M., loc. cit. supra, Argument I (3) Contra, 140.
Accord: Fitzpatrick, Bernard H., loc. cit. supra, Argument II
(B) (4).
4. Once it is adopted for a few key industries, the wages fixed there will
blanket the country, as our post-war experience indicates. Demand for state control of basic elements of our economy will be irresistible, and endanger the preservation of the free enterprise system.
Sigal, Benjamin C., loc. cit. supra, Argument 1 (2) Contra, 217.
5. If the government forces employees to stay on the job, it must compel
employers to maintain the job. In extreme cases, it will have to give subsidies,
or some other means insuring his ability to stay in business.
Ross, G. C., loc. cit. supra, Argument II (A) (1) Contra, 20.
6. If its use is not restricted to situations of critical need, then it will be an
inciting force toward a managed economy.
Williams, Jerre S., loc. cit. supra, Argument I (2) Pro, 657.
7. In Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Communist Russia there were and
are no strikes. If we want their type of labor peace, we must accept their type
of governm-ent.
Waldman, Louis, Senate Hearings, 80th Congress, Part 1, 429.
BIBLIOGRAPHY-CONSTITUTIONAL

QUESTIONS

I. Conflict with Federal Constitution
A. Full discussions:
Simpson, Sidney Post, "Constitutional Limitations on Compulsory
Industrial Arbitration," 38 Harv. L. Rev. 753-792 (1925).
Williams, Jerre S., "The Compulsory Settlement of Contract Negotiation Labor Disputes," 27 Texas L. Rev. 587, 619-636 (May 1949).

COMPULSORY

ARBITRATION

OF LABOR DISPUTES

Comment, "Labor Law-Compulsory Arbitration of Labor Disputes," 47 Mich. L. Rev. 242, 244-254 (December 1948).
Note, "Constitutionality of Public Utility Compulsory Arbitration
Statutes," 49 Columbia L. Rev. 661-676 (May 1949).
B. Brief treatment, note, or conclusions:
69 ALR 816.
Gerhart, Eugene C., "Strikes and Eminent Domain," 30 Jour. Am.
Jud. Soc. 116-119 (1946).
Huebner, Carl A., "Compulsory Arbitration of Labor Disputes,"
30 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc. 123, 126-128 (1946).

Richberg, Donald R., "Case for Restriction of Strikes by Law," 19
LRRM 143-144 (1947).

Smith, Russell A., and DeLancey, William J., "The State Legislatures and Unionism," 38 Mich. L. Rev. 987, 1029-1031 (1940).
II. Conflict with the Taft-Hartley Law; jurisdiction:
174 ALR 1052-1078.
Duff, Clair V., and Stockdale, Craig T., "Public Utility Labor Disputes," 19 Penna. Bar Asso. Q. 197-213 (1948).
Smith, Jam'es Morgan, "Bonine-Tripp v. Taft-Hartley: Compulsory Arbitration of Labor Disputes in Public Utilities," 9 Detroit L. Rev.
58-64 (1948).
Smith, Russell A., "The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction
Over Labor Relations," 46 Mich. L. Rev. 593, 621-623 (1948).
Williams, Jerre S., loc. cit. supra, I (A), 636-641.
BIBLIOGRAPHY-RECENT COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENTS
Williams, Jerre S., "The Compulsory Settlement of Contract Negotiation Labor Disputes," 27 Texas L. Rev. 587-658 (May 1949),
Roberts, Harold S., Compulsory Arbitration of Labor Disputes (University of Hawaii: Legislative Reference Bureau 1949), 55 pp.

149

